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Apr. 27,1967.]
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I:

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM
BANDHAUEH, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] .Homicide - Evidence - Manslaughter: Instructions - Mansla.ughter. - The evidence did not support a manslaughter
instruction based on homicide committed during heat of
passion or a sudden quarrel where it was shown that defendant and the victim met in a tavern, which they left together in
a car driven by defendant, that the victim. was drunk and was
refused drinks at a few bars, that defendant drank beer but
did not appear intoxicated, that he was seen with the victim
about an hour before the victim, was discovered shot a few
blocks from the abandoned car, that defendant's footprints fit
those near the victim's body and his fingerprints were identical with those in the car, that bullets from defendant's gun
killed the victim, that the victim's wallet was found empty
and defendant had about the same amount of money the
victim had previously had, and that the car keys and keys for
the victim's truck were found in defendant's motel room.
[2] Id.-Evidence-Manslaughter: Instructions-Manslaughter;~
The record did not support defendant's claim that he was
sufficiently intoxicated to lack the malice necessary to constitute murder and therefore entitled to a voluntary manslaugh-

McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, §§ 148, 190(2); [2]
Homicide, §§ 148, 190; [3] Homicide, § 105; [4] Criminal Law,
§211; [5] Criminal Law, §617(1); [6, 7, 9] Criminal Law,
§ 1011(3); [8] Criminal Lnw, ~§ 587, 1011(3); [10] Jury, § 44.
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ter instruction on the theory of diminished capacity where it
appeared that during the evening with defendant the victim
was refused drinks because of his apparent intoxication but
that defendant was not, that defendant did not appear to be
intoxicated during the six hours he was seen at various bars
with the victim, and that defendant was not seen to have had
more than six or seven beers during that time.
[S] ld.-Evidence--Other Crimes.-In a prosecution for murder,
the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence
that defendant had stolen license plates and the car in which
he drove the victim, where the evidence supported the prosecution's theory of robbery murder by indicating a plan to use a
stolen vehicle to commit robberies.
[4] Oriminal Law - Plea - Withdrawal. - The trial court could
properly assume that defendant's decision, arrived at with the
advice of counsel, to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity, was intelligently and voluntarily made where
defendant had a psychiatric examination that his counsel had
arranged.
[5] ld.-Argument of Oounsel-Scope of Ooncluding Argument.Counsel may vigorously argue his case and is not limited to
"Chesterfieldian politeness," but he cannot overreach by stating his personal belief based on facts not in evidence.
[6a,6b] ld.-Procedure to Determine Penalty-Argument.-In the
penalty phase of a murder trial, the prosecutor's argument on
his public responsibility was not, by itself, subject to objection where he stated that he was running for office, that he
bore a public officer's mantle of trust requiring him to be fair,
and that he had objected to certain evidence, indicating that it
might be damaging to defendant.
[7a, 7b] ld.-Procedure to Determine Penalty-Argument.-In the
penalty phase of a murder trial, where testimonial statements
by the prosecutor were injected gradually into the argument
so that it was not until he asserted that he had seldom seen a
more depraved character that grounds for objection were
apparent, it was then too late to cure the error by admonition
and any effort of the prosecutor to cure the error by formal
retraction would have compounded it; under these circumstances, defendant was not precluded from raising the issue
for the first time on appeal.
[8] ld.-Argument of Oounsel: Procedure to Determine PenaltyArgument.-At a trial on the issue of guilt, the prosecutor's
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 258; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal

Law, § 508.
[6] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 251, 254; Am.Jur.2d, Crimi-

nal Law, §§ 583, 586.
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burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt justifies his
closing the argument as well as opening it; at the penalty
trial, however, neither side has the burden to prove that one
or the other penalty is proper and there is no logical reason to
favor one side over the other in argument. Equal opportunity
to argue - is also consistent with the Legislature's strict
neutrality in governing the jury's choice of penalty.
[9] ld.-Procedure to Determine Penalty-Argument.-Scrupulous
regard for complete impartiality and fairness dictates that the
extent of argument on each side at a penalty trial should be
equal; each side should have an opportunity to rebut the
other's argument. Accordingly, the prosecution should open and
the defense respond; the prosecution may then argue in rebuttal and the defense close in surrebuttal.
[10] Jury-Qualification-Scruples Against Capital Punishment.A juror's mere doubts with respect to the death penalty are
not sufficient to disqualify him so long as he conscientiously
believes that he could return a death penalty verdict in a
proper case. What constitutes a proper case is for the juror to
decide.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior C.ourt of Riverside CoUnty. John Neblett, Judge. Reversed in part and
affirmed in part.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first
degree murder reversed insofar as it relates to penalty and
affirmed in all other respects.
Herbert E. Selwyn, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and S. Clark Moore, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury convicted defendant William
Bandhauer of first degree murder of Walter Ashley Smith
and fixed the penalty at death. This appeal is automatic. (Pen.
Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
[1] Defendant met Smith at Thelma's Tavern in Riverside at approximately 8 p.m. on February 25, 1966. He introduced himself as Mike to Smith's friend, Gerald Allen
Thomas, and drank beer with Smith and played pool with
him. The three men left Thelma's Tavern in a blue Ford
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station wagon driven by defendant. Smith was drunk and was
refused drinks at a few bars. Defendant did not appear
intoxicated although he was seen drinking beer. When the last
bar was closing at 2 a.m., Thomas found that defendant and
Smith had left without him while he was playing pool. He
had last seen them together at 1 :20 a.m.
Defendant was next seen at 4 :30 a.m. on the 26th when he
rented a room at the Wagon \Vheel Motel. He arrived without
a car and told the manager that his car had broken down on
the freeway. He did not appear drunk, although he looked
tired and dirty. He gave a fictitious name and left at
9 :30 a.m.
An engineer on a passing train saw Smith's body on the
railroad right-of-way near Myers Street in Arlington at 2 a.m.
that morning. Police officers arrived about 2 :30 a.m. and
found that Smith had been shot six times. They found a .22
caliber shell casing near the body and footprints around it
and in the vicinity. There was no money in Smith's wallet,
although he had approximately $75 in cash the previous
morning. A few streets away the officers found a blue Ford
station wagon abandoned in a ditch, and in the station wagon
they found expended and live shells and a license plate. They
removed fingerprints from the car and placed them on
cards.
About 11 :45 a.m. on February 26, 1966, a police officer, who
had been given a description of defendant as a murder
suspect, saw him on the street. He stopped defendant and
asked if he had any identification. Defendant produced a
receipt for rent paid by Paul L. Moslands. The officer
searched defendant and found a .22 caliber revolver and Jivp
ammunition and approximately $75 in cash. The officer told
defendant that he was being arrested on suspicion of
murder.
Defendant's footprints fit those near Smith's body, and his
fingerprints were identical with those taken from the station
wagon. The bullets that killed Smith were fired from the gun
taken from defendant.
Police officers searched defendant's room at the Wagon
Wheel Motel and found keys that fit the station wagon and
also keys that fit a pickup truck owned by Smith.
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity but later withdrew the plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity. He did not offer any evidence at the trial on the
issue of guilt but attempted to rebut by cross-examination and
I!
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closing argument inferences drawn from the eviden,ce by the
prosecution.
Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to give
any instruc~ion as to voluntary manslaughter was reversible
error. There is no evidence that would support a manslaughter instruction based on the theory of homicide committed during the heat of passion or during a sudden quarrel.
[2] Defendant asserts, however, that there was evidence that
he was sufficiently intoxicated to lack the malice necessary to
constitute murder, and therefore he was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction on the theory of diminished
capacity. (See People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 319 [49 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911].)
The record does not support this contention. Although
Smith was refused drinks during the evening because of his
apparent ,intoxication, defendant was not. He was not seen to
have had more than six or seven beers during the six hours he
was at various bars between 8 p.m. and 2 a.m., and he did not
appear to be intoxicated. There is no evidence that his "drinking had any substantial e1fect on him, or that he was so
intoxicated that he did not or could not harbor malice. There
is thus no substantial evidence of diminished capacity to
support a voluntary manslaughter instruction on that theory.
[3] Defendant claims that ~t was prejudicial error to"
admit evidence that he had stolen the station wagon and the
license plates on it. He asserts that there was abundant evidence to connect him with the station wagon and that it was
needlessly prejudicial to introduce evidence that he had stolen
the car and its plates. Such proof, however, was relevant- not
only to connect defendant with the car, but as evidence of his
plan, motive, and intent throughout the night of the crime. It
tended to rebut any inference that he abandoned the car
because he was intoxicated, and it supported the prosecution's theory of robbery murder by indicating a plan to use a
stolen vehicle to commit robberies. Accordingly the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. (See
Pfople v. McCaughan, 49 Ca1.2d 409, 421 [317 P.2d 974];
People v. Gonzales, 87 Cal..App~d 867, 877 [198 P.2d 81].)
It is next contended that the trial court erred in allowing
defendant to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity without making an independent determination that
he could intelligently withdraw the plea. The trial court
determined that the withdrawal of the plea was voluntary.
(See People v. Wein, 50 Ca1.2d 383, 408-409 [326 P.2d

)
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457].) [4] Defendant was fully advised of his rights
before he withdrew the plea, and he indicated that he had
discussed the matter with his counsel. Since defendant had a
psychiatric examination arranged for by his counsel before
the plea was withdrawn, the trial court could properly assume
that defendant's decision, arrived at with advice of counsel,
was intelligently and voluntarily made.
Defendant asserts that the district attorney was guilty of
prejudicial misconduct in making statements to the jury that
he believed in defendant's guilt and that he believed that
defendant should be given the death penalty. [5] Counsel
may vigorously argue his case and is not limited to "Chesterfieldian politeness" (Ballard v. United States (9th Cir. 1945)
152 F.2d 941, 943 (reversed on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187
[91 L.Ed. 181, 67 S.Ct. 261]) ; People v. Nicolaus, 65 Ca1.2d
866, 880 [56 nal.Rptr. 635, 423 P.2d 787]; People v.
Hardenbrook, 48 Ca1.2d 345, 352-353 [309 P.2d 424]), but he
cannot overreach by stating his personal belief based on facts
not in evidence. (People V. Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 730 [16 Cal.
Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809].) \Ve find no
violation of this rule at the trial on the issue of guilt.
At the trial on the issue of penalty, however, the prosecutor
in the guise of argument presented facts not in evidence.
[Sa] From the outset of the trial, the prosecutor informed
the jury that he was running for office and that as a public
officer he bore a mantle of trust that required him to be fair.
At the beginning of his argument on the issue of penalty he
statcd : ". . . as I told you right from the start-there is only
one person in this courtroom that is required to see that the
defendant gets a fair trial anymore than I am, and that is t11('
judge." The prosecutor pointed out to the jury why he l)ad
objected to the introduction of certain evidence, indicating
that he thought that it might be damaging to defendant.
[7a] Within a short time a·fter he had laid this foundati(JlI
of his public responsibility he told the jury: "During the
many many years that I have been prosecutor, I have spell
some pretty depraved character [sic]. Usually th(~y are kin(l
of ·old because it takes a little while to become this depraved.
But it has seldom been my misfortune to see a more deprave
[sic] character than this one." Further along in his argument the prosecutor told the jury: ". . . I have stood before
this court on occasions and recommended life imprisonment in
first degree murder cases. . . . " The statement that defendant was one of the most depraved characters that the prose-
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eutor had seen was testimonial. It was not related to the
evidence in the case and was not subject to cross-examination.
It presented to the jury an external standard by which to :fix
the penalty based on the prosecutor's long experience. The
error was aggravated by the prosecutor's telling the jury that
he would recommend life imprisonment in a proper case, for
he thus made clear that his request for the death penalty was
based on his personal judgment and belief. (See State v.
Horr, 63 Utah 22, 46 [221 P. 867] ; Levin and Levy, Persuading the Jury, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 139, 156.)
rrhe Attorney General contends that since there was no
objection, this issue cannot be raised on appeal. [6p] The
argument on the public responsibility of the prosecutor was
not by itself subject to objection. [7b] The testimonial
statements were injected gradually into the argument so that
it was not until the prosecutor made the clinching assertion
that he· had seldom seen a more depraved character that
grounds for objection were apparent. It was then too late to
cure the error by admonition, and any effort of the prosecutor
to cure the error by formally retracting what he obviously
believed would only l~ave compounded it. Under these circum.
stances defendant is not precluded from raising the issue for
the first.time on appeal. (People v. Love, supra, 56 Ca1.2d 720,
733.) It is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
defendant would have been reached in the absence of the
prosecutor 's presentin~ to the jury facts not in evidence.
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13;* People v. Hines, 61 Ca1.2d 164,
169 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398] ; People v. Hamilton, 60
CaI.2d 105,136-137 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4,383 P.2d 412].)
Two questions remain that may arise on retrial.
Defendant contends that in the argument at the trial on the
issue of penalty, the prosecution should not have been allowed
two arguments when the defendant had only one. We have
previously held on the basis of the analogy to the practice at
the trial on the issue of guilt that the prosecution may also
open and close the argument at the trial on the issue of
penalty. (People v. Love, supra, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 725; People v.
Oonzales, 56 Cal.2d 317, 319 r14 Cal. Rptr. 639, 363 P.2d 871J ;
People v. Corwin, 52 Ca1.2d 404, 407 [340 P.2d 626] ; see Pen.
Code, § 1093. subd. 5.) Upon further consideration, however,
we have concluded that the analogy to the trial on the issue of
guilt should not control the practice on the issue of penalty.
[8] The prosecutor's burden of proving guilt beyond a
*Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8, 1966.

._ .... -..... -
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reasonable doubt at the trial on the issue of guilt justifies his
closing the argument as well as opening it. At the trial on the
issue of penalty, however, neither side has the burden of
proving that one or the other penalty is the proper one in the
case at hand, and there is no logical reason to favor one side
over the other in argument. Equal opportunity to argue is
also consistent with the Legislature's strict neutrality in
governing the jury's choice of penalty. (People v. Green, 47
Cal.2d 209,217-232 [302 P.2d 307].) [9] Although we are
of the opinion that there is no reasonable probability that the
sequence of closing argument alone would affect the result
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 j . People v. lVatson, 46 Cal.2d 818,
836 [299 P.2d 243]), we believe that scrupulous regard for
complete impartiality and fairness dictates that the extent of
the argument on each side at the trial on the issue of penalty
should be equal and that each side should have an opportunity to rebut the argument of the other. Accordingly, hereafter the prosecution should open and the defense respond.
The prosecution may then argue in rebuttal and the defense
close in surrebuttal.
Defendant contends that the court excused jurors for cause
without adequately establishing that their views with respect
to the death penalty disqualified them. The questions asked by
the court were somewhat ambiguous and further elucidation
might have revealed that some of the jurors who were excused
merely had doubts with respect to the death penalty.
[10] Such doubts are not sufficient to disqualify a juror so
long as he conscientiously believes that he could return a death
penalty verdict in a proper case. (People v. Nicolaus, supra,
65 Cal.2d 866, 882; People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 789 [48
Cal.Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222] ; People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690,
712 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365].) What constitutes a
proper case is, of course, for the juror to decide.
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to penalty. In
all other respects, it is affirmed.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.

j.

f

!

PETERS, J.-I agree with the majority that reversible
error was committed in the penalty trial, and so I agree with
the reversal of the penalty judgment. But I dissent from tlIe
majority opinion insofar as it affirms the determination of

t
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-Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8, 1966.
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guilt. I believe that there was some evidence of intoxication,
and that defendant was therefore entitled to a manslaughter
instruction based on the concept of diminished responsibility.
The law on this point is well settled. It is not whether there
was "substantial" evidence to support the defense of diminished capacity, as stated by the majority, but whether there
was "any" evidence, no matter how "weak" or "incredible" to support that defense. These principles were summarized in People v. Oarmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768,at page 773 [228
P.2d 281], where it was said: "Section 1127 of the Penal
Code provides: '. . . The court shall inform the jury in all
cases that the jurors are the exclusive judges ot all questions
of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of the
witnesses.' (Emphasis added.) It has been held that a
defendant is entitled to instructions on his theory of the case
as disclosed by the evidence, no matter how weak. As so ably
'stated in People v. Burns, 88 Cal.App.2d 867, 871 [200 P.2d
134], with ample citation of authority: 'It is elementary that
the court should instruct the jury upon every material question upon which there i.~ any evidence deserving of any
consideration whatever. (People v. iQuimby, 6 Cal.App. 482,
486 [92· P~ 493] ; People v. Foster, 79 Cal.App. 328, 337 [249
P. 231]; People v. Hill, 76 Cal.App.2d 330, 343 [173 P.2d
26].) The fact that the evidence may not be of a character to
inspire belief does not authorize the refusal of °an instructio'n
based thereon. (People v. Perkins, 75 Cal.App.2d 875, 881
f171 P.2d 919] ; People v. Peete, 54 Cal.App. 333, 356, 359
[202 P. 51] ; People v. lVong lIing, 176 Cal. 699, 705-706 [169
P: ~57].) TJlat is a question within the exclusive province of
the jury. IIowet'er incredible the testimony of a defendant
may be he is entitled to an 1'nsfr'ltction based upon the
hypothesis that it is entirely true. (People v. Perkins, supra,
p. 881; People v. lVilliamson,6 Cal.App. 336, 339 [92 P. 313] ;
People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 234 [3 P. 818].) . . . ' "
This principle has bren reaffirmed on many occasions. In
People v. Modesto, 59 Ca1.2d 722 [31 Ca1.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d
33], Oa.rmen was not only reaffirmed but it was held that if
the instruction should have been given failure to give it waR
per se reversible. (See also People v. Oonley, 64 Ca1.2d 310
[ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911].)
In the instant case there was some evidence, perhaps weak,
and prrhaps not very ('ollvincing', that drfc'ndant was under
the influence of alcohol sufficient to affect his judgment when
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the crimes were committed. As the majority opinion correctly
discloses, defendant was in the company of Smith and Thomas
from 8 p.m. until about 2 a.m. The evidence is uncontradicted
that all were drinking during this period. Smith was so
visibly drunk that several bars refused to serve him any more
drinks. While the evidence is that defendant was not visibly
intoxicated there is evidence, referred to by the majority, thnt
defendant" was not seen to have had more than six or seven
beers. " Thus he was observed to have had at least six or
seven beers. If each bottle contained a pint of beer that would
mean defendant consumed at least three and one-half quarts,
or nearly a gallon, in less than six hours. If each glass
contained only 10 ounces that would equal 70 ounces, or
substantially over two quarts. The majority necessarily hold
that, as a matter of law, that quantity of beer could not have
affected the judgment of defendant. In so holding the
majority are, in my opinion, improperly weighing the eYidence, refusing to indulge in possible inferences in favor of
defendant, and setting themselves up as experts in the field of
alcoholism. There is, of course, substantial evidence that
defendant did not appear affected by his consumption of the
liquor, but the point is that there is some evidence to support
an inference that he had consumed enough liquor so that his
judgment could have been affected. There certainly is some
evidence "no matter how weak" to support such an inference
and to bring this case within the ambit of the rule requiring
an instruction on dhninished responsibility.
BURKE, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgment as
to guilt but dissent from the reversal of the judgmeJ;1t as to
penalty.
,The majority hold that a few isolated remarks of the prosecutor selected out of his closing arguments that extend over
35 pages of transcript require reversal of the judgment as to
penalty even though at the trial no objection was made to the
remarks. Most of the 35 pages of the prosecutor's arguments
concerned matters such as the brutal nature of the killing, the
fact that defendant "emptied this gun into [his victim's]
body, some from the back and some from the front," defendant's long history of criminal and other antisocial conduct,
and his repeated failures to take advantage of opportunities
given him to rehabilitate himself. At one place alone in the
argument the prGspcutor stated, "During the many years that
I have been a prosecutor, I have seen some pretty depraved

)
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character [sic]. Usually they are kind of old because it takes a
little while to become this depraved., But it has seldom been
my misfortune to see a more depravec [sic] character than
this one. If Mr. 'Valter Ashley Smith has forfeited his right
to live at the hands of Mr. Bandhauer, I don't think that we
should be' particularly upset about Mr. Bandhauer now
having to forfeit his life for the life that he has led in the
past few years. It is not a very equal trade, is it t"
Subsequently the prosecutor stated, "I can readily see in
some cases of first degree murder-and I have stood before
this court on occasions and recommended life imprisonment in
first degree murder eases-for example," and the prosecutor
went on to state two examples of ca~es where the death
penalty might not be justified: the first, a crime of passion
where one spouse was found in a compromising position by
the other spousc; and, the other, a crime in which the particular participant took no active part in a robbery and murder,
except to drive the getaway car and had told his partner not
to use a loaded gun because he did not want to be involved in
any killing. The prosecutor then stated that in the instant·
case "You don't have; just a trigger man. You have a
vicious, cold-blooded killer here. This man wanted to make
sure Mr.:Walter Ashley Smith was dead. There was only one
reason for that-so he couldn't get on this witness stand and
tell us what happened. This man has had enough of State
Prison and didn't want to go back, and the one man who
could send him back . . . [was] Mr. Walter Ashley Smith."
In Peop(,e v. Lopez, 60 Ca1.2d 223, 251-252 [32 Cal.Rptr.
424, 384 P.2d 16], which affirmed judgments imposing the
death penalty, this court unanimously held that a statement
by the prosecutor "that he had never seen a more cold-blooded
killing" was a proper argument at the penalty trial. The
prosecutor in Lopez had not taken the stand to testify, and
this court apparently was of the view that the quoted statement was not to be interpreted literally but rather was merely
a way of saying that the killing was an extremely coldblooded one, a fact fully warranted by the evidence. The
prosecutor's statement in Lopez is similar to the prosecutor's
statement here that defendant was one of the most depraved
characters that the prosecutor had seen. If the instant statement were construed as merely an assertion that defendant
was extremely depraved, the argument is not improper since
the evidence fully justifiNl such an assertion. (People v.
Terry, 57 Cal.2d 538, 561 [21 Cal.Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985] j
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People v. lVein, 50 Ca1.2d 383, 395-396 [326 P .2d 457].) There
was evidence that defendant robbed and intentionally killed
the decedent by firing six bullets into the victim's body
including one that entered his heart and that defendant shot
the decedent from the back as well as the front. The evidence
also showed that defendant has a juvenile court record, was
dishonorably discharged from the armed services, and has
been convicted of various crimes including receiving stolen
property, forgery, and escape from a county farm.
Even if the prosecutor's statements pointed to by the
majority were improper, defendant may not now complain
since he made no objection at the trial. Had one been made,
the trial court could easily have removed any harmful effect
of the remarks by instructing the jury to disregard them.
(People v. Jackson, 59 Cal.2d 375, 381 [29 Cal.Rptr. 505, 379
P.2d 937] ; People v. Brice, 49 Ca1.2d 434, 437 [317 P.2d 961] ;
People v. Hampton, 47 Cal.2d 239, 240-241 [302 P.2d 300].)
Moreover, the remarks of the prosecutor referred to by the
majority are but a minor portion of his arguments, and at the
close of the arguments the jury was instructed that it should
not consider as evidence any statement made by counsel
during the trial unless such statement is made as an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts
and that the jury should decide the case solely upon thc evidence presented to it and the instructions given by the court.
Under the circumstances any error in the arguments in question was not prejudicial under article VI, section 13, of our
Constitution.. (People v. lVilson, 60 Ca1.2d 139, 156 [32
Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452] ; People v. Pike, 58 Ca1.2d 70, 96
[22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656] ; People v. Garner, 57 Ca1.2d
135, 156 [18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680] ; People v. Lane, 56
Ca1.2d 773, 787 [16 Cal.Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57].)
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 24,
1967. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition sllOuld
be granted.

